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NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS MADE AFTER AN AT-WILL
EMPLOYEE HAS COMMENCED EMPLOYMENT: TOWARD A
GOOD FAITH STANDARD FOR THE "AFTERTHOUGHT"
AGREEMENT
MICHAEL J. GARRISON & JOHN T. WENDT*
INTRODUCTION - THE CASE OF PAR RIDDER
When you mention "the newspaper" in the Twin Cities, two names
come to mind. The St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star Tribune
have been long-time rivals with intense competition for readers and
advertisers. Shockwaves were created when P. Anthony "Par" Ridder,
whose family had been involved with the Pioneer Press for four
generations, left to become the publisher at the Star Tribune. Walker
Lundy, who served as the Pioneer Press editor from 1990 to 2001, and later
became editor of the Philadelphia Inquirer, said, "It's a little like the
president of South Korea going to be the president of North Korea."'
The Pioneer Press is the oldest newspaper in Minnesota, tracing its
origin back to 1849.2 Ridder Publications3 acquired the morning Pioneer
Press in 1927, and St. Paul served as its headquarters. In 1974, Ridder
Publications and Knight Newspapers merged to become Knight-Ridder, and
for a time, became the largest newspaper chain in the country with over 35
daily newspapers.
* Michael J. Garrison, Professor of Business Law, and John T. Wendt, Associate Professor of
Business Law, Department of Ethics and Business Law, Opus College of Business, University of
St. Thomas. Professors Garrison and Wendt recognize and acknowledge the valuable research
assistance and support of Stephanie Evers, a graduate of the University of St. Thomas School of
Law, and Anthony Truong, our current research assistant.
1. Jennifer Saba, Twin Cities Intrigue Sign of Larger Issue, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Sept.
12, 2007, http://www.editorandpublisher.com/Article/Twin-Cities-Intrigue-Sign-of-Larger-Issue.
2. St. Paul Dispatch-Pioneer Press, St. Paul Dispatch-Pioneer Press: An Inventory of its
Records at the Minnesota Historical Society, MINN. HISTORICAL Soc'Y (2009),
http://www.mnhs.org/library/findaids/00530.xml.
3. Ridder Publications was founded in 1892 when Herman Ridder acquired the German-
language Staats-Zeitung. Knight Newspapers was founded by John S. Knight, who inherited the
Beacon Journal from his father in 1933.
4. St. Paul Dispatch-Pioneer Press, supra note 2.
5. Jay P. Pederson, International Directory of Company Histories, (Thomas Derdak et al.
eds., 2005), available at http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/knight-ridder-inc-
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The Ridder family was intimately involved in running the Pioneer Press
for four generations. Bernard H. Ridder Jr., the father of Tony Ridder and
grandfather of Par Ridder, served in various positions from publisher to
chief executive officer and chairman of the board from 1958 to 1982.6
"Several members of the Ridder family worked their way through the
Pioneer Press, ultimately stamping that paper with the Ridder name [.
Par was the sixth Ridder to run the Pioneer Press.
Across the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, the dominant paper is the
Star Tribune which traces its roots back to the Minneapolis Tribune, a paper
founded in 1867.9 The Cowles family, another institutional name in
newspaper reporting, bought the Star Tribune in 1935, which served as the
jewel in the crown of the Cowles' newspaper empire.10 According to Ken
Doctor, a former editor with the Pioneer Press, "Legend has it, for years the
Ridder family and the Cowles family had a gentlemen's agreement they
wouldn't cross the river.""
In one of the largest newspaper company sales ever, The McClatchy
Company bought the Star Tribune in 1998, ending 62 years of ownership by
the Cowles family.1 2 McClatchy has been in the newspaper business since
1857 starting with the Sacramento Bee.1 3
In 2006, The McClatchy Company announced it was going to sell the
Star Tribune to Avista Capital Partners, a private investment group, for
$530 million (a sharp decline from the $1.2 billion it paid nine years
earlier).1 4 At the time, the Star Tribune Publisher and President Keith
history/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
6. Carissa Wyant, Publisher Ridder Ordered Out of Minneapolis Job, SAN FRANCISCO
BUSINESS TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2007/09/17/daily23.html?page=all.
7. Jennifer Saba, Trouble in the Twin Cities: How Par Ridder Drew Fire, EDITOR &
PUBLISHER, Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.editorandpublisher.com/Article/Trouble-in-the-Twin-
Cities-How-Par-Ridder-Drew-Fire.
8. Matt McKinney, Star Tribune Publisher Forced to Step Down, STAR TRIBUNE, Sept. 18,
2007, http://www.startribune.com/business/I 1224996.html?page=all&prepage=1&c=y#continue.
9. Id.
10. Id. In 1935 the Cowles family purchased The Minneapolis Star (an evening paper); in
1941 The Minneapolis Tribune (a morning paper); and in 1982 the papers merged into The
Minneapolis Star Tribune, later known simply as the Star Tribune. Id.
11. Id.
12. The Media Business; McClatchy in $1.4 Billion Cowles Deal, N.Y. TIMES BUSINESS
DAY,Nov. 14, 1997,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9803E4D61438F937A25752C1A961958260.
13. THE MCCLATCHY COMPANY, Overview, ABOUT,
http://www.mcclatchy.com/100/story/179.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
14. Press Releases, McClatchy to Sell the Star Tribune to Avista Capital Partners: Sale
Provides Tax Advantages, Lowers Debt and Enhances Flexibility and Competitive Position for
McClatchy, The McClatchy Company (Dec. 26, 2006),
http://www.mcclatchy.com/176/story/1820.html.
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Moyer told Star Tribune employees in an e-mail, "Avista is a company that
believes in the future of newspapers and is strongly committed to the
success of the Star Tribune . .. I have had the opportunity to get to know
Avista leadership quite well recently, and I can say this without hesitation:
They are progressive, very smart, good-hearted people."
However, two months later, Moyer announced that he would leave the
Star Tribune when ownership changed from McClatchy to Avista.16 A
search for Moyer's replacement began immediately.17 It did not take long to
find a publisher. On March 5, 2007, less than a month later, Par Ridder, 38,
scion of the Knight-Ridder family and president and publisher of the rival
Pioneer Press was named as the publisher and CEO of the Star Tribune
Company.
The high profile appointment of Ridder was short lived. Allegations
immediately surfaced that not only had Ridder violated his non-compete
agreement with the Pioneer Press but that he also had intentionally
misappropriated sensitive trade secrets. Before he left the Pioneer Press, in
a March 30, 2007 statement, Ridder stated, "I highly respect the
confidentiality of any sensitive Pioneer Press information I was exposed to
over the years as its publisher. [. . . ]I haven't used and wouldn't use any
confidential Pioneer Press information to create an unfair advantage for the
Star Tribune."19 Ridder later admitted, however, to copying sensitive
information from his Pioneer Press computer and then transferring it to his
new computer at the Star Tribune, and sharing some of the important
documents with key Star Tribune executives.20
When Ridder announced his resignation from the Pioneer Press, Dean
Singleton, CEO of MediaNews Group, Inc., who runs the Pioneer Press,
said he was not worried about trade secrets.21 Singleton felt much
differently later. "I didn't know at that time the magnitude of the heist. . . I
thought at the time that Par would make a gracious exit, and would be
15. Brian Bakst, McClatchy Co. Flagship Newspaper Star Tribune Sold to Private Equity
Group for $530Million, USA TODAY Dec. 27, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-
12-26-star-trib x.htm.
16. Carissa Wyant, Ridder Leaves Pioneer Press for Star Tribune, MINNEAPOLIS/ST PAUL
BUSINESS JOURNAL, Mar. 5, 2007,
http://twincities.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2007/03/05/daily2.html.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Amy Forliti, St. Paul Pioneer Press Sues Ex-Publisher, USA TODAY: MONEY, Apr. 13,
2007, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/2007-04-13-1089155732_x.htm.
20. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Star Tribune Publisher Testifies that He Took Data from
Competitor, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 26, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/25/AR2007062501732.html.
21. ASSOCIATED PRESS, AP Looks at Ridder's Alleged "Espionage ", EDITOR & PUBLISHER,
Apr. 15, 2007,
http://www.editorandpublisher.com/Archive/AP-Looks-at-Ridder-s-Alleged-Espionage-.
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honorable, and I didn't know he had stolen everything we had."2 2
According to a Star Tribune story, Ridder had not only kept confidential
information on a Pioneer Press laptop computer that he took with him to the
Star Tribune, but also took financial information stored on a USB drive.2 3
This secret information included budgets, monthly profits, employee wage
data, and perhaps most important, the amounts advertisers were paying.2 4
After the Pioneer Press asked Ridder to return the USB drive, Ridder, in his
deposition, stated that he sent back a new USB drive in an unopened
package; "I returned a USB drive, not the USB drive."2 5
The Pioneer Press sought an injunction to enforce the non-compete
agreement against Ridder and to enjoin the Star Tribune and Avista from
employing Ridder, in order to protect trade secrets and confidential
information that Ridder allegedly misappropriated.2 6 Because Ridder had
signed the non-compete agreement two weeks after he started at the Pioneer
Press, he asserted that it could only be enforced if he was provided
"independent" consideration - some consideration in addition to continued
employment.2 7
Following Minnesota law, the court found the non-compete
unenforceable because it was not supported by independent consideration.2 8
However, because of Ridder's audacious taking of trade secrets, the court
barred Ridder from working for the Star Tribune based on his violation of
the Minnesota Uniform Trade Secrets Act2 9 and his common law duty of
confidentiality. "Given Ridder's past conduct and his cavalier attitude
toward his use and disclosure of confidential Pioneer Press information, it
seems to the Court that his past actual misappropriation is a good indicator
of possible future misappropriation or use of confidential Pioneer Press
information."3 0 On December 7, 2007, Par Ridder, as part of a settlement
agreement, resigned from the Minneapolis Star Tribune,3 1 and the Star
22. Id.
23. Matt McKinney, Ridder Says He Took Private Data to Job at Star Tribune, STAR
TRIBUNE, June 26, 2007, http://www.startribune.com/535/story/1266979.html.
24. AP Looks at Ridder's Alleged "Espionage", supra note 20.
25. McKinney, supra note 22.
26. Final Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary Injunction, Northwest
Publ'n et al. v. Star Tribune Co. et al., No. 62-C6-07-003489, 2007 WL 2814555 (Minn. Dist. Ct.,
July 16, 2007) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Motion].
27. Id.
28. Northwest Publ'n, L.L.C. v. The Star Tribune Co., No. C6-07-003489, 2007 WL
2791691 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Order and Memorandum].
29. Id. See generally, Uniform Trade Secrets Act, MINN. STATS. §§ 325C.01-08 et seq.
30. Order and Memorandum, supra note 27
31. See Braking Par: Ridder Out at 'Star Tribune' After Legal Settlement, EDITOR &
PUBLISHER, (Dec. 7, 2007), http://www.editorandpublisher.com/Article/Braking-Par-Ridder-Out-
at-Star-Tribune-After-Legal-Settlement; see also Business Wire, Clear Channel Outdoor Appoints
Par Ridder to Branch President of Chicago Division, BUSINESS WIRE, Dec. 16, 2010,
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Tribune embarked upon a journey to find a new publisher.
Interestingly, Par Ridder was not the only former-Pioneer Press
employee to have been presented with a non-compete agreement after his
employment had already begun. One of Par Ridder's co-defendants was
Kevin Desmond, who served as Vice President of Operations at the Pioneer
Press.3 2 When he was interviewing for the position, Desmond was never
told that he would have to sign a non-compete agreement, and in his
original letter of offer of employment from Par Ridder, there was no
reference to a non-compete agreement or the requirement that he sign one.3 3
After he accepted the position, moved to the Twin Cities, and started his
position, he was approached by Karen Clary, Vice President of Human
Resources and Labor Relations at the Pioneer Press to sign a non-compete
agreement. Desmond was told "as a part of [his] continued employment"
and that he "didn't have a choice in the matter."3 4 The court concluded that
the non-compete agreement was unenforceable since it was not supported
by independent consideration.3 5 Desmond continued to work at the Pioneer
Press for approximately two and a half years during which time he was
allowed "access to confidential information, participation in strategy
development, raises, participation in executive bonus program, and a stay
bonus [. . .]."3 However, neither the continued employment nor the benefits
were tied to the requirement that he sign the non-compete agreement and
thus did not provide the bargained-for consideration that would have
rendered the afterthought agreement enforceable.3 7
The Par Ridder case presents the important policy issue of what
constitutes sufficient consideration for the so-called "afterthought"
agreement3 8-a non-compete agreement signed sometime after an at-will
http://www.businesswire.com/newsihome/20101216005188/en/Clear-Channel-Outdoor-Appoints-
Par-Ridder-Branch#.Us8LWbm9Ns.
32. The other co-defendant, Jennifer Parratt, served as Director of Targeted Publications at
the St. Paul Pioneer Press. Order and Memorandum, supra note 30. Parratt's initial letter of offer
of employment at the Pioneer Press for that position was contingent upon her signing a
confidentiality and non-compete agreement. Id. Parratt signed the agreement on March 27, 2006,
began employment at the Pioneer Press on June 5, 2006 and worked for there for approximately
nine months. Id. The court noted that when she accepted the position and signed her non-compete
agreement it was "ancillary to her initial employment agreement, the offer of employment was
sufficient consideration to support her Non-Compete Agreement, and no additional consideration
was required." Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Order and Memorandum, supra note 27.
36. Id
37. Id
38. See Jordan Leibman & Richard Nathan, The Enforceability of Post-Employment
Noncompetition Agreements Formed after At-Will Employment has Commenced: The
"Afterthought" Agreement, 60 S. CAL L. REv. 1465 (1987) (coining the "afterthought" agreement
phrase).
No. 2] Non-Compete Agreements Made After an At-Will Employee 153
Has Commenced Employment
employee has commenced work. Frequently, employees are presented with
and execute non-compete agreements days or even years after their initial
hiring date. Sometimes afterthought agreements are connected with a
promotion or other advancement, while in other cases an employee will
receive no change in status or benefits.
The afterthought context includes what one commentator refers to as
"cubewrap" contracts, non-compete agreements presented to new
employees a short time after the employee has agreed to and commenced
employment. 39 There is empirical evidence that some firms strategically
manage the process of securing the consent of new employees to non-
compete agreements by intentionally delaying the presentment of such
agreements until after employment has commenced, when the employee's
bargaining position is weaker.4 0 The practice of "springing" non-compete
agreements on unsuspecting employees after employment has started, rather
than during the negotiation process, deserves particular attention as a
potential bad faith practice.4 1 Thus, our analysis of the afterthought
agreement includes, but is not restricted to, the "cubewrap" scenario.
Part I of this article provides an overview of the policy interests
underlying employee non-compete law and implicated by the afterthought
agreement. The proper regulatory approach to the afterthought agreement,
as with the approach to employee non-compete agreements in general,
involves a delicate balance of competing employer, employee, and societal
interests. Part II of this article examines the balance of those competing
interests under the majority rule by critically examining one of the leading
cases adopting that approach, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals'
decision in Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Company (Simko).4 2 Our analysis
suggests that the majority approach provides a practical resolution of the
consideration issue consistent with the employment-at-will doctrine.
However, the forbearance and continued employment rationales underlying
39. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of
Employee Bargaining Power Via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963, 966
(2006) (coining the "cubewrap contracts" phrase). The phrase "cubewrap contracts" refers to non-
compete agreements presented to employees-or left in their cubicles-after the employee has
already accepted the employment offer and started work; analogous to the delayed disclosure of
license terms under "shrinkwrap" agreements. Id.
40. Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Non-Compete Agreements and the Mobility of
Technical Professionals, 76 AMER. Soc. REV. 695, 700-06 (2011) (survey of 1,029 engineers and
interviews with 52 patent holders in automatic speech recognition industry found that non-
compete was included with the employment offer fewer than one-third of the time and that
employees not presented with non-compete at time of offer were less likely to have a lawyer
review the non-compete terms).
41. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard
Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637 (2007) (arguing for mandatory pre-
employment disclosure of non-compete agreements).
42. Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co., 464 A.2d 1104 (1983) [hereinafter Simko].
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the majority approach do not effectively discourage and may actually
encourage bad faith in the afterthought setting. Part III of this article
provides similar analysis of the minority approach through the window of
the Minnesota Supreme Court opinion which adopts that position in Davies
& Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies (Davies).43 The minority rule provides a
substantial check on unfair bargaining tactics by employers in the
afterthought context, but the requirement of independent consideration is
over-inclusive and may result in abuse of employers by employees, as the
Par Ridder case illustrates.
We conclude in Part IV by suggesting that an alternative good faith
standard would be a preferable policy approach. As under the majority rule,
a good faith requirement would allow employers to freely modify the terms
of employment to protect their interests in trade secrets and customer
relationships. However, it would necessitate adherence to good faith
practices in securing the employee's consent to the afterthought agreement.
At the same time, a good faith standard would provide a check on employer
bad faith, as under the minority approach, but without the necessity of
independent consideration. We believe that a good faith standard could
provide the courts and parties with a more flexible and workable standard, a
standard that fairly and effectively balances the competing interests in the
afterthought context. We intend to offer a detailed policy rationale for a
good faith requirement and develop the specifics of our proposed good faith
standard in a subsequent article on the afterthought agreement.
I. THE REGULATION OF EMPLOYEE NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS AND THE
AFTERTHOUGHT AGREEMENT
The proper regulation of employee non-compete agreements involves a
delicate balance of competing employer, employee, and societal interests.4 4
Employers have a need to protect their trade secrets and business goodwill
from misappropriation by former employees.4 5 Although competition by
former employees is inevitable, and non-compete agreements should not be
the means by which open competition or new market entrants are stifled,
employers have an interest in protecting the informational and relational
interests of the firm.4 6 Thus, preventing unfair competition through the
43. Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127 (1980) [hereinafter Davies].
44. This paper is an extension of our recent research and writing on employee non-compete
agreements. See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee
Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. Bus. L.J.
107 (2008). For a historical and policy discussion of employee agreements not to compete with
employers after termination of employment, see Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to
Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1960), and see also T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in
Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2005).
45. Blake, supra note 42, at 653.
46. Leibman & Nathan, supra note 36, at 1483-90.
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improper exploitation of an employer's assets is the primary employer
interest justifying restraints on post-employment competition.
Former employees have a legitimate property interest in their own
human capital development.4 7 They should be free to use the intellectual
capital acquired at work in competition with their former employers-
including the general knowledge, skills, and experience gained in the
industry-so long as they do not misappropriate the employer's property
rights.4 8 Non-compete agreements implicate employee interests in mobility
and professional advancement.4 9
Society has an interest in protecting intellectual property rights and in
preventing unfair competition. The enforcement of employee non-compete
agreements, particularly in the protection of trade secrets, is part of an
intellectual property law regime that is designed to provide incentives for
the commercial development of new products, services, and ideas.o
Conversely, society needs to ensure that unnecessary barriers to entry into
the marketplace are minimized to ensure a robust, competitive
environment-the underlying driver of any capitalistic economy.
Moreover, society has an important interest in the efficiency of markets for
scarce human resources. 52 To the extent that non-compete agreements
impose unreasonable restrictions on labor mobility, they result in an
inefficient allocation within labor markets. 53 Thus, non-compete agreements
implicate conflicting societal interests in free and fair competition, but the
overriding policy concern is with ensuring competitive markets that support
and encourage innovation and entrepreneurship.
The issue of consideration for an afterthought agreement also involves a
balance of competing employer, employee, and societal interests.
Employers need the flexibility to adjust the terms and conditions of
47. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership ofHuman
Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002).
48. Id. at 763.
49. See, e.g., Standard Brands Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F.Supp. 254, 259 (E.D. La. 1967) (an
employee "must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to change jobs without abandoning the
ability to practice his skills").
50. See generally Maureen B. Callahan, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A
Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 705-06 (1985) (explaining the grounds upon which courts
examine the reasonableness of post-employment restraint agreements).
51. Reed, Roberts Assoc., Inc v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) ("[O]ur
economy is premised on the competition engendered by the uninhibited flow of services, talent
and ideas.").
52. Standard Brands Inc., 264 F.Supp. at 259 ("[T]he employee who possesses the
employer's most valuable confidences is apt to be highly skilled. The public is interested in the
reasonable mobility of such skilled persons from job to job in our fluid society, which is
characterized by and requires the mobility of technically expert persons from place to place, from
job to job and upward within the industrial structure.").
53. Blake, supra note 44, at 627.
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employment relationships as the needs of the business change, including
changes in the knowledge and experience of employees justifying the
request for mid-stream non-compete agreements. 54  For example, an
employer may request a non-compete agreement when an employee is
promoted to a sensitive managerial position or when an employee has
developed client or customer relationships that could be exploited if the
employee works for a competitor or establishes a competing business.
On the other hand, employees presented with an agreement after
employment has commenced are placed in a weakened bargaining position,
particularly when they have changed their own positions by terminating an
existing position or passing on other opportunities.5 6 Employers may be
able to exploit their superior bargaining position and secure a non-compete
on terms that are more favorable than they would have secured had the
negotiations on the non-compete agreement been open and transparent.5 7
Moreover, employers may be able to use the power to terminate an
employee to coerce an afterthought agreement since almost all courts refuse
to provide a remedy for an employee discharged for refusing to sign a non-
compete agreement,58 even when the proposed non-compete agreement is
patently unreasonable.59
54. See, e.g., Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 548 S.E.2d 207 (S.C. 2001) (employee of
travel agency requested to sign non-compete agreement three and one half years after employment
commenced).
55. See, e.g., Guidant Sales Corp. v. Baer, No. 09-CV-0358, 2009 U.S. District LEXIS
15630 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 2009) (non-compete agreement adjusted to reflect promotion to regional
sale manager).
56. E.g., PEMCO Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885, 890 (W.Va. 1979) ("The employee ...
terminated the lease in the Washington, D.C. area and thereafter, in reliance on the agreement,
signed a contract to purchase a home located in Bluefield, West Virginia. The record conclusively
establishes that it was not until he actually arrived at the employer's plant to commence actual
work that he was first presented a purported 'Employment Agreement.' Under the circumstances
in which the employee found himself, it is beyond cavil that his ability to negotiate with respect to
the post-employment restraint was markedly diminished. At the very least, the employee was not
as freely able to bargain concerning the provision as he was at the time the oral contract of
employment was formed. The covenant not to compete was not freely bargained for term or
condition of employment, but rather was a term or condition of employment extracted from or
imposed upon an employee under circumstances which deprived him of any fair ability to
negotiate. Perhaps, as the record strongly suggests, plaintiff s employment practices were not such
that the belated presentment of the 'Employment Agreement' was a deliberate, intentional
bargaining tactic, designed to effectively take this economically valuable bargaining item off the
table. Nonetheless, the effect is in the same direction.").
57. Id.
58. See Michael J. Garrison & Charles D. Stevens, Sign This Agreement Not to Compete or
You're Fired! Noncompete Agreements and the Public Policy Exception to Employment at Will,
15 EMP. RESPONSIBILITIES & RIGHTS. J. 103 (2003).
59. E.g., Maw v. Advanced Clinical Communications, Inc., 846 A.2d 604 (N.J. 2004). For a
critique of the Maw decision, see Michael J. Garrison, Limiting the Protection for Employees from
Compelled Noncompete Agreements Under State Whistleblower Laws: A Critical Analysis of Maw
v. Advanced Clinical Communications, 20 LAB. LAW. 257 (2005).
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Generally, the law of employee non-competes balances these interests
through the application of the common law reasonableness test, the
prevailing judicial standard in most jurisdictions.6 0 Under that standard,
courts strictly analyze the terms of employee non-compete agreements, both
the business justification for and the scope of such restrictive covenants.6 1
Employers must demonstrate a legitimate protectable interest served by an
agreement not to compete, ordinarily an interest in protecting trade secrets
or customer relationships,6 2 and establish that the restriction is no more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest in terms of the restricted
activities.6 3
But how that balance should be struck in the so-called "afterthought"
agreement-a non-compete agreement signed sometime after an employee
has commenced work-has divided and perplexed both courts and
commentators.6 4 To resolve the conflicting interests in the afterthought
context, courts have developed two approaches to the consideration issue.
The majority rule holds that the continued employment of the employee or
the employer's forbearance from terminating the employee is sufficient
consideration for an afterthought agreement.6 5 Courts adopting the majority
rule generally require the continued employment to exist for a substantial
period of time to avoid bad faith on the part of the employer securing a new
60. See, e.g., Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531 (Wyo. 1993). Although
the common law standard is employed in most states, California and other jurisdictions restrict or
prohibit employee non-compete agreements under restraint of trade statutes. Garrison & Wendt,
supra note 36, at 120-22. Other jurisdictions have adopted standards that are more permissive
than the common law. Id. at 122-35. For the most comprehensive and systematic analysis of state
non-compete laws, see Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways To Leave Your Employer: Relative
Enforcement of Covenants Not To Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility
Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 751 (2011).
61. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 36, at 119-20 ("The probing examination of the terms of
noncompete agreements under the common law approach [is] a form of strict judicial
scrutiny .... In effect, employee agreements not to compete come to the court with a heavy
presumption of invalidity. The burden is on the employer to justify the need for and the
reasonableness of the terms of the agreement.").
62. See Blake, supra note 37,at 653-74 (discussing interests in customer relationships and
trade secrets).
63. The type of activities the employee is prohibited from engaging in under the non-
compete agreement must be tied to the legitimate interests the employer is seeking to protect. See,
e.g. , Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F.Supp. 2d 667 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (covenant
overbroad because it limited former employee from working for competitor in any capacity and
precluded him from selling products that were not directly competitive).
64. See Leibman & Nathan, supra note 31 at 1484-85 (arguing for statute requiring that
afterthought agreements be in writing, that employees not be subject to discharge for refusing to
sign such agreements, but no new consideration should be necessary); see also Kathryn J. Yates,
Note, Consideration for Employee Noncompetition Covenants in Employments at Will, 54
FORDHAM L. REv. 1123, 1130 (1986) (arguing that continued employment is sufficient
consideration based on unilateral contract approach to issue).
65. Yates, supra note 63, at 1130.
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promise not to compete.6 6 The majority rule is sensitive to the interests of
employers and consistent with the employment-at-will doctrine.
The minority approach rejects the notion that mere continuation of
employment is sufficient consideration for an afterthought agreement.
Courts adopting the minority rule require separate or independent
consideration for an afterthought agreement to be enforceable.6 7 This
independent consideration can be a promotion, an increase in salary, a
bonus, a fixed term of employment, or something of value beyond the
continuation of employment.6 8 The minority rule is primarily concerned
with the unfair bargaining position of employees in the afterthought
context,6 9 and it is consistent with the common law pre-existing duty rule
that generally requires new consideration for a modification of a contract to
be binding.7 0
In the next sections, we present two of the leading afterthought cases;
one adopting the majority "continued employment" approach and the other
adopting the minority "independent consideration" rule. A critical analysis
of the cases, and the rationales underlying the divergent judicial approaches,
reveals the weaknesses of either approach to the afterthought agreement.
This analysis suggests the need for an alternative standard for the
afterthought agreement.
II. THE MAJORITY APPROACH TO THE AFTERTHOUGHT AGREEMENT
One of the leading cases for the majority approach to the afterthought
agreement is the opinion of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in
Simko,.7 In 1971, Graymar-a company engaged in the sale and
maintenance of business machinery and office equipment-demanded that
Paul Smith, one of its existing employees, sign a non-compete agreement.7 2
The non-compete agreement prohibited Smith from competing with
Graymar for one year post-employment, within a 50-mile radius of
Baltimore.7 3 Smith initially refused to sign the agreement but relented when
66. Id. at 1130-31.
67. E.g., Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 548 S.E.2d 207 (S.C. 2001); see also Yates,
supra note 63, at 1132.
68. Labriola v. Pollard Group Inc., 100 P.3d 791, 794 (Wash. 2004).
69. See, e.g. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 130-33 (Minn. 1980) (noting that "[m]ere
continuation ... could be used to uphold coercive agreements" and refusing to enforce non-
compete agreement without independent consideration where employee did not have an
opportunity to examine restrictive covenant until after quitting his old job and starting
employment).
70. See George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, 347 A.2d 311, 316 (Pa. 1975) (citing James C.
Greene Co. v. Kelley, 134 S.E.2d 166, 167 (N.C. 1964)).
71. 464 A.2d 1104 (Md. App. 1983).
72. Id. at 1105.
73. Id.
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he was threatened with discharge if he did not. 4 According to the court,
"Because his wife was pregnant with their first child and he was facing
embarrassment, he knuckled under and signed the agreement."7 5
As a salesperson for Graymar, Smith was paid on a commission and
bonus basis. 6 In 1981, he had difficulties collecting his bonuses and
decided to leave the company.7 He started his own business, Simko, Inc.,
with another former Graymar employee. 8 Initially, the post-employment
relationship between Smith and Graymar was amicable.7 9 Graymar later
commenced suit, however, to enforce the non-compete agreement when
Smith and Simko refused to cease their competitive activities, and an
injunction was granted that prevented Simko and Smith from doing
business with certain Graymar customers.so
On appeal, Simko and Smith contended that the agreement not to
compete was unenforceable, arguing that mere continuation of the
employment of an at-will employee is insufficient consideration to support
a post-employment covenant not to compete." The Simko court treated this
as a case of first impression, although it found support for the majority
position in the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Dahl v. Brunswick
Corporation.8 2 There, the court enforced a severance pay policy against an
employer reasoning that such "policy directives" become contractual
obligations when employees, with knowledge of the policy, either start or
continue working for the employer.8 3 The Simko court was not convinced
that Dahl could be distinguished:
The employees' continued service was determined to be
consideration for the employer's promise of severance pay in Dahl.
In the case at bar, the employer consented not to terminate the
employment relationship in return for the employee's covenant not
to compete. The employment at-will relationship is mutual in that,
generally, either party may terminate the relationship at any time.
Given the inherent mutuality, we see no basis for distinguishing the
employee's consent to continue from the flip side of the coin-the
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Simko, 464 A.2d at 1105.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1105-06.
81. Id. at 1106.
82. 356 A.2d 221 (1976).
83. Id. at 224.
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employer's consent not to terminate. 84
Nevertheless, the court proceeded to analyze the competing approaches
and resolve the issue of continued employment as consideration in the
afterthought context.
The Simko court noted that the minority view-continued employment
is not consideration for an afterthought agreement-is a "distinct" minority
position that is unpredictable." However, it recognized the most persuasive
argument for the minority approach is the illusory nature of the employer's
promise of continued employment.8 6 The Simko court cited Kadis v. Britt, A
consideration cannot be constituted out of something that is given and taken
in the same breath-of an employment which need not last longer than the
ink is dry upon the signature of the employee, as where the performance of
the promise is under the definite threat of discharge."8 7 It rejected, however,
the minority rule's requirement of independent consideration as a "bright
line but inequitable" doctrine.
The court embraced the dual rationale for the majority approach; that is,
sufficient consideration for an afterthought agreement exists "in either the
agreement not to discharge or in the continued employment for a substantial
period of time after execution of the restrictive covenant."8 9 Although the
court believed that a threat to discharge is not necessary, since it can be
inferred, it found that "the threat of discharge was the express and
galvanizing force which prompted Smith's acquiescence."9 0 Since Smith
continued to be employed for another ten years after the agreement, the
court concluded that "both forms of consideration recognized by the
majority courts were present in this case."9 1
In response to the illusory promise rationale underlying the minority
rule, the court adopted the qualification that the continued employment
must exist for a substantial period of time.9 2 The court reasoned that such a
qualification to the majority rule is necessary to avoid injustice:
Were an employer to discharge an employee without cause in
an unconscionably short length of time after extracting the
employee's signature to a restrictive covenant through a threat
of discharge, there would be a failure of the consideration. An
84. Simko, 464 A.2d at 1106.
85. Id. at 1107.
86. Id.
87. 29 S.E.2d 548 (N.C. 1944).
88. Simko, 464 A.2d at 1107.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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employer who bargains in bad faith would be unable to enforce
the restrictive covenant.9 3
How long employment must continue was not specified, nor did the
court adopt standards to determine this matter. The court was of the mind
that this determination would be made on an ad hoc basis under the facts
and circumstances of particular cases.9 4 It did note, however, "that
continuance of employment for a period of ten years imparts sufficient
consideration." 9 5
Finally, the court rejected Smith's argument that the agreement was
entered into under duress. It recognized that "under appropriate
circumstances the threat of discharge to induce an employee to sign a
restrictive covenant may constitute duress." 9 6 But it found no duress since
any threat was legitimate and necessary to protect Graymar's interests, and
there was no evidence that Smith was deprived of free will. 97 Since Smith
was a successful salesman with other job opportunities had he left Graymar,
the court found that Smith was not left without reasonable alternatives when
Graymar threatened to fire him if he did not sign the non-compete
agreement.9 8
The Simko case demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of the
majority approach. From a practical perspective, the majority approach has
considerable value. It provides employers with the freedom to modify the
terms and conditions of the employment relationship at-will, just as the
employment-at-will doctrine allows them the power to terminate the
relationship at-will. Changes in the employment contract can be done
without unnecessary formalities and without the need for independent
consideration. This is important in highly competitive environments with
evolving, ever-changing employment relationships. From a pragmatic
standpoint, the majority rule also offers greater assurance compared to the
minority rule which adopts legitimate protectable interests in trade secrets
and customer relationships will be protected and unfair competition by
former employees will be prevented.
From a contract doctrine perspective, the rationale underlying the
majority approach creates some inconsistencies. In reality, the employer's
promise of continued indefinite employment is illusory. From the
perspective of the employee, his or her position is unchanged after the non-
93. Simko, 464 A.2d at 1107.
94. Id. at 1107-08.
95. Id. at 1108.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Simko, 464 A.2d at 1108.
162 UNIV OF ST THOMAS JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. VIII
compete is signed while the employer's position has been enhanced by the
post-employment restrictions on the employee. The forbearance rationale is
an attempt to bolster the finding of consideration, but it too creates some
issues of logical consistency. If the consideration the employer provides is a
commitment not to immediately discharge the employee, then why would
the continued employment need to exist for a substantial period of time?
The logical extension of the forbearance rationale would suggest that
employers are free to terminate an employee the day after the agreement is
signed, but this was troubling to the court. Thus, the argument is advanced
that an immediate termination would be a failure of consideration. But if the
employer gives up the present legal right to terminate and retains the future
right to terminate, how is there a failure of consideration if an employee is
terminated after the afterthought agreement is signed? And if good faith is
the rationale for the substantial continued employment rule, then why is
good faith not required in the bargaining for an afterthought agreement?
The qualification to the majority approach that employment must exist
for a substantial period of time also creates additional practical issues. How
long must the continued employment last to satisfy the court's standards
and what are the factors that go into such an analysis? Courts have held that
"several years" is substantial but seven months is not.9 9 This after-the-fact
determination obviously creates uncertainties for employers. Does this rule
apply if the employee voluntarily terminates the relationship? Some courts
have so held,"oo but others have rejected this on the basis that the rationale
of the qualification to the majority rule is to prevent employer bad faith.10 1
And there is a more fundamental problem with this requirement of
substantial continued employment. By determining whether consideration
was substantial enough, courts are in effect assessing the adequacy of
consideration for the afterthought agreement contrary to fundamental
contract law principles.102
The Simko case also highlights another negative aspect of the majority
rule. Rather than encourage good faith negotiation, the forbearance
99. Compare Woodfield Group, Inc. v. DeLisle, 693 N.E.2d 464, 469 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(citing Agrimerica, Inc. v. Mathes, 557 N.E.2d 357, 362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (two years considered
substantial)) with Mid-Town Petroleum, Inc. v. Gowen, 611 N.E.2d 1221, 1227 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (seven months not substantial).
100. Diederich Ins. Agency, LLC. v. Smith, 952 N.E.2d 165, 169 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)
("[T]hree months of continued employment did not constitute sufficient consideration. The fact
that defendant quit does not change the analysis.").
101. See LKQ Corp. v. Thrasher, 785 F. Supp. 2d 737, 742-43 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (questioning
whether the substantial continued employment rule applies to voluntary departure of employee
since the rule is intended to prevent employers from terminating shortly after an afterthought
agreement is signed).
102. See McGough v. Nalco Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 729, 747-48 (N.D W. Va. 2007) (noting
that "weighing the adequacy of consideration" is something "traditional contract law warrants
against").
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rationale actually encourages employers to threaten discharge to secure an
afterthought agreement. To clearly establish that the employer gave up its
legal right to immediately terminate the employee in exchange for the non-
compete agreement, an explicit threat, although not necessary according to
the Simko court, may be advisable.
On balance, the majority rule provides a pragmatic approach to the
afterthought agreement, one that is consistent with the at-will employment
relationship and provides substantial protection for an employer's
legitimate business interests. The majority approach, however, does not
effectively address all forms of bad faith in the afterthought context,
particularly those relating to negotiation process. Rather than insist upon a
voluntary agreement, the hallmark of any true contract, the majority
approach may actually encourage unfair bargaining by employers, practices
that have driven some courts to adopt the minority rule.
III. THE MINORITY APPROACH TO THE AFTERTHOUGHT AGREEMENT
A leading case for the minority approach is the opinion of the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Davies,10 3 a consolidated appeal in which
Davies & Davies Agency, Inc., an insurance agency, sought to enforce two
afterthought non-compete agreements against former employees Richard
Davies and Robert Buckingham.1 0 4 In sum, the Davies court found that the
non-compete agreement executed by defendant Richard Davies was
enforceable (as modified by the trial court)"o' but the agreement signed by
defendant Buckingham was unenforceable due to a lack of consideration. 10 6
The non-compete dispute in Davies was particularly acrimonious
because it arose out of a family business. Everett Davies owned an
insurance agency and hoped his sons would come into and eventually take
over the business.1 0 7 His eldest son, Richard, was twenty years old and a
senior at the University of Minnesota when he joined the business in 1967
and started doing general office and clerical work.10 s About four months
after Richard started working and just before his 21st birthday, he was
presented with and signed a non-compete agreement that precluded him
from working in the insurance business for five years within a 50-mile
radius of the cities of Minneapolis, St. Paul, or Duluth. 109
Everett Davies argued that he did not require Richard to sign the
103. 298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980).
104. Id. at 128.
105. Id. at 131.
106. Id. at 133.
107. Id. at 129.
108. Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 129.
109. Id.
164 UNIV OF ST THOMAS JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. VIII
agreement at the time of Richard's hire because Richard was a minor and
believed that because of his minor status the agreement would be void.110
However, Everett also stated that he would not support Richard's
application for a license, nor would Richard be permitted to assume more
duties than his clerical work, unless Richard signed the agreement."'
Richard continued to work in the agency gaining an expertise in the sale of
probate and court bonds, which were a significant part of the agency's
business. 112
Over the years Everett gradually phased himself out of the bonds
portion of the business.1 1 3 The relationship between Everett and Richard
became strained when they could not see eye-to-eye concerning the
management decisions and their respective involvement within the agency's
operations. After Richard left the agency, he went to work for a competitor,
the Pat Thomas Agency.1 14 The Davies & Davies Agency sued to enforce
the non-compete agreement based on the diversion of clients to Richard's
new employer.1
The Davies court noted that decisions in other jurisdictions regarding
the enforceability of an afterthought agreement are quite evenly divided.1 1 6
But the court was sensitive to the rationale for the minority rule, specifically
the potential for unfair bargaining by employers in the afterthought setting:
Those cases which have held that continued employment is not a
sufficient consideration stress the fact that an employee frequently
has no bargaining power once he is employed and can easily be
coerced. By signing a noncompetition agreement, the employee
gets no more from his employer than he already has, and in such
cases there is a danger that an employer does not need protection
for his investment in the employee but instead seeks to impose
barriers to prevent an employee from securing a better job
elsewhere.117
The court rejected the notion that continuation of employment, standing
alone, was sufficient for the afterthought agreement. As the court stated,
"Mere continuation of employment as consideration could be used to
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Davies, N.W.2d at 129.
114. Id. at 129-30.
115. Id. at 130.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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uphold coercive agreements."11
The court adopted a two-part standard under the minority rule,
indicating that an afterthought non-compete must be "bargained for and
provide the employee with real advantages,"1 1 9 a determination that will
depend on the facts of each case.12 0 In Richard's situation, the court found
the necessary independent consideration in his position with the agency:
Richard derived substantial economic and professional benefits
from the agency after signing the contract: He [sic] continued his
employment for 10 years and advanced to a selling position within
the agency which would not have been open to him if he had not
signed the contract. He received informal training from Everett
Davies, was supported by the agency in his license applications,
and had sole responsibility for many of the agency's customers.
Richard's brother, John, who refused to sign an agreement, was
limited to a largely clerical position during his tenure with the
agency.121
In Richard's appeal, the Davies court found that his employment
agreement, which allowed him to advance in the company and basically
made him a successor to his father, gave him "real advantages," more than
just continued employment.1 2 2 Also, these benefits were "bargained for"
since they were tied to his successor position and not something that he
would have been entitled to otherwise.1 2 3 This was supported by the fact
that his brother, John, did not receive the same benefits and was limited to a
clerical position.
In contrast, the Davies court found that the non-compete agreement was
unenforceable in the Buckingham appeal.1 2 4 Near the end of Richard's
tumultuous tenure at the agency, Everett was looking for a successor.
Buckingham, already successfully employed elsewhere, was recruited, not
to be an employee, but rather with promises for majority ownership, an
agreement that was memorialized by a non-binding letter of intent signed
by Everett. 12 5 Relying on those promises, Buckingham resigned from his
company and joined the Davies & Davies agency in February of 1977.126
118. Davies, N.W.2d at 130
119. Id. at 131.
120. Id. at 130.
121. Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 131.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 133.
125. Id. at 132.
126. Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 132
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Eleven days after he started working for the agency, Everett presented
Buckingham with a non-compete agreement that he reluctantly signed with
the proviso that his consent was based on the letter of intent.1 2 7 However,
despite Buckingham's continued requests for Everett to honor the letter of
intent, Everett never completed the sale to Buckingham.1 2 8 Frustrated,
Buckingham left Davies & Davies in June of 1978 and went to work for a
competitor, the Ed Arnold Company.1 2 9 Though there was no evidence that
Buckingham actively solicited any of the Davies' clients, several did
contact Buckingham to handle their insurance business.13 0
The Davies court found that there was no independent consideration for
the non-compete agreement that Buckingham had signed, stating:
The issues in the Buckingham case are the same as those in the
Davies case. The trial court found, and the evidence is clear, that
while Buckingham had been made aware of the existence of the
Restrictive Covenant during employment negotiations, he was not
given an opportunity to examine or inspect the document, although
he requested it, nor advised that he was required to sign or lose his
job until 11 days after he commenced employment with the Davies
agency and 28 days after he terminated his employment with his
former employer.13 1
Unlike Richard Davies, Buckingham did not receive any consideration
other than continued employment, which was deemed insufficient to
enforce the non-compete signed eleven days after employment commenced.
The Davies case demonstrates the advantages of the minority approach
from a policy standpoint. By requiring independent consideration for an
afterthought agreement, the minority approach protects the employee from
the negotiating leverage that employers have in the afterthought setting. It
provides some protection from the "cubewrap" scenario in which employers
fail to disclose the requirement of a non-compete agreement until after
employment has commenced. The threat of discharge is still a potent
weapon for employers, but by requiring some negotiated benefit to an
employee, the power of an employer to coerce a one-sided, non-compete
agreement is lessened.
From a purely contract doctrine perspective, the minority rule can be
viewed as consistent with the common law pre-existing duty rule that
127. Id. at 133
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 133.
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modifications of a contract require new consideration to be binding. On the
other hand, courts adopting the minority rule and finding consideration for a
non-compete at the inception of the employment relationship, but not
during the course of that relationship, are faced with an inherent
inconsistency. In either situation, the employee's promise not to compete is
supported only by the employer's promise of indefinite employment. If one
is analyzing the issue from a strictly contract doctrine perspective, it is
unclear why the law should recognize the employer's promise of indefinite
employment as consideration at the beginning of, but not during, the
relationship. The employment-at-will doctrine presents a similar problem of
logical consistency. It does not necessarily make sense to say that an
employer can terminate a contract of employment-at-will but does not have
the right to change the terms of the contract at will!
The practical problems with the minority approach are two-fold. First,
the requirement of independent consideration is over-inclusive in terms of
the rationale of preventing coerced non-compete agreements. It not only
protects an employee like Buckingham in the Davies case, where there was
substantial evidence of bad faith conduct by the employer, but it also
shields someone like Par Ridder from non-compete obligations that were
voluntarily assumed. Certainly, Ridder should have known that a non-
compete agreement would be expected of the publisher of the Pioneer
Press, and there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the newspaper
or a lack of bargaining power by him. The agreement was deemed
unenforceable under the minority approach simply because it was executed
two weeks after Ridder started working for the paper. Had his
misappropriation of trade secrets not been so blatant, Ridder could have
joined the Star Tribune as its publisher and conceivably exploited his inside
knowledge to unfairly compete with the Pioneer Press.
Second, the minority approach takes an extremely formalistic approach
to the afterthought agreement. Under the two-part standard in Davies, an
employee must receive "real advantages," something in addition to what the
employee was already receiving.1 3 2 Conceivably, even an increase in pay or
promotion would not be sufficient if the employee would have received the
benefits with or without the non-compete agreement. This is reinforced by
the requirement that any independent consideration must be the bargained
for in exchange for the non-compete promise. Thus, the minority rule may
create difficulties for unsuspecting employers, a trap for the unwary
employer who either does not provide adequate separate consideration, or
does not adequately document an employee's change in status as the price
paid for in exchange for the employee's consent to a non-compete
132. Id. at 131.
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agreement.
Overall, the minority rule tempers the unfair bargaining position
employers have in the afterthought context by providing an incentive for
employers to negotiate in a transparent manner and at the inception of the
employment relationship. However, the requirement of independent
consideration is too blunt and formalistic of a judicial instrument to regulate
the afterthought agreement and may upset the delicate balance of competing
interests under employee non-compete law.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION: A GOOD FAITH STANDARD FOR
THE AFTERTHOUGHT AGREEMENT
Our analysis of the competing policy approaches suggests that neither
provides a proper resolution of the competing interests implicated by the
afterthought agreement. Both standards recognize the potential for bad faith
in the afterthought context. The majority approach resolves that potential
problem by imposing a requirement that employment continue for a
substantial period of time. In this way, an employee is ensured of some
tangible benefit in exchange for the post-employment restrictions imposed
upon the employee under the non-compete agreement. But this requirement
is artificial and inconsistent with the logic of the underlying forbearance
rationale. Substantial continued employment is not bargained for
consideration between the parties to an afterthought agreement, and this
requirement is a legal fiction that requires the courts to ultimately determine
the adequacy of consideration-which is categorically contrary to
fundamental contract law principles.
The existing framework thus creates results in uncertainty and potential
inequities, particularly in situations where bad faith practices occur in the
negotiation process. The Davies case highlights one of those bad faith
practices that is not addressed by the majority approach. The tactic of
delaying the disclosure of non-compete requirements until employees have
detrimentally changed their bargaining positions, and started work, is a bad
faith practice that should be discouraged but that is permitted under the
majority approach. The pragmatic and simple solution that the majority
approach offers is consistent with the employment-at-will doctrine, and it
allows employers protection for their trade secrets and customer
relationships as the at-will relationship evolves over time. But it may permit
employers to unfairly utilize their bargaining position to impose a non-
compete on employees or to impose post-employment restrictions that are
broader than would have been agreed to by the parties, had the negotiating
process been clean and transparent from the very beginning.
The minority approach also recognizes the potential for bad faith in
terms of the employer's bargaining power. To ensure a good faith
agreement, and some tangible benefit to an employee in exchange for the
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non-compete covenant, the minority rule requires independent
consideration. Again, this judicial construct creates a number of logical
inconsistencies under contract and employment law. Why the law should
recognize the employer's promise of indefinite employment as sufficient
consideration at the inception of the employment relationship, but not
during the relationship, is not apparent.
Moreover, the minority rule conflicts with the practical realties of the
modern employment relationship. Employees develop knowledge,
experience, and training over time. At the beginning of the relationship,
there may be no need for-and in fact no legal justification for -insisting
upon post-employment restrictions. However, as the employment
relationship continues, an employee may be exposed to trade secrets or
develop personal relationships with customers or clients. The minority rule
does not allow the employer to secure a non-compete covenant mid-stream
without some additional consideration even if the agreement is truly
voluntary and necessary to protect the employer's interests. And the
consequences are potentially severe, since an employee that had not been
provided with additional, independent consideration-yet nevertheless
gained knowledge of trade secrets during the course of their employment-
could potentially exploit the information acquired or relationships
developed. The Par Ridder case provides an illustrative example of the
potential for unfair competition resulting from a strict application of the
minority rule requirement of independent consideration.
Rather than address the potential for bad faith in the afterthought
agreement by requiring either independent consideration or substantial
continued employment, we contend that a requirement of good faith be
required in the afterthought context to directly address the problem of bad
faith practices in this setting. There are a number of advantages of a good
faith standard. First, it continues to permit employers the flexibility they
need to protect their business assets by securing non-compete covenants as
employment relationships develop over time. Second, it would provide an
incentive for employers to be open and transparent in the negotiation
process for a non-compete covenant at the inception of and during the
course of the employment relationship. Third, the good faith requirement
would provide a more flexible framework for courts to determine the
consideration issue in the afterthought context. Finally, consistent with
contract law, the ultimate issue in these cases would be the voluntariness of
the afterthought agreement-the fundamental hallmark of an enforceable
contract.
Obviously, thought must be given to the contours of such a good faith
standard. We intend to offer a detailed and persuasive policy rationale for a
good faith standard and fully develop the specifics of our proposed good
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faith standard in a subsequent article on the afterthought agreement.
